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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
for making wire scouring brushes which contained an improved device
for supporting a pair of wires substantially parallel and adjacent to each
other was not an old combination. 9
To avoid overclaiming an invention where the novelty is situated in
only one element of a combination but the improved element can merely
be substituted for a corresponding old element without affecting the
other elements in the combination, the following alternatives are avail-
able: (1) patenting the novel element per se20 when such element is
meaningful by itself, i.e., without combining it with the other elements
of the combination or (2) patenting the novel element only for use in
a particular combination or environment,21 where such a novel element
is not meaningful by itself and is difficult to describe without reference
to the other elements of the combination. However, this latter method of
claiming an invention must be used with discretion, because the en-
vironmental elements constitute part of the claimed invention as they
are limitations in the claim, 22 thus patenting the novel element per se
may often be more appropriate.
Bernard Kleinke
'9 American Technical Machinery Corp. v. Caparotta, 229 F. Supp. 479, 141 U.S.P.Q.
386 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
20 Supra note 3.
2l Ex parte Jepson, 1917 Dec. Com. Pat. 62, 243 O.G. Pat. Off. 525 (1917).
22Ex parte Belcher, 58 U.S.P.Q. 34 (Pat. Off. Bd. App., 1942).
TAXATION-PUBLIC RECORDS DOCTRINE AS LIMITED BY
TAXPAYER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Brewer, a special agent for the Secretary of the Treasury (engaged
in a tax examination), served a summons' upon Wild, as president of a
corporation, to produce certain records2 regarding the tax liability of
Wild as an individual. Wild appeared but refused to come forth with
I The authority to issue summons is provided in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7602:
"For the purpose of ascertaining correctness of any return ... determining the liability
of any person for any internal revenue tax .... the Secretary or his delegate is au-
thorized-(1) to examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be
relevant or material to such inquiry..."
The agent's investigative authority is evidenced by his pocket commission, which is
usually sufficient to obtain compliance with requests for records.
2 Records required from the Air Conditioning Supply Co. were general ledger,
books of original entry, subsidiary ledgers, sales invoices, bank statements with can-
canelled checks, minute book, and stock ledger.
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the records. He claimed that such production would tend to violate his
constitutional rights against self-incrimination and unreasonable search and
seizure, even though the records being summoned were those of the
corporation rather than his personal records. Since he was the sole stock-
holder of that corporation, he contended that it was his alter-ego, and
that use of the corporation's records would violate his constitutional right
against self-incrimination. Brewer then made application to the district
court which ordered Wild to produce the records. Wild's appeal to the
court of appeals was sustained and the district court order was reversed.
But upon rehearing, the court affirmed the order of the district court.
Wild v. Brewer, 329 F. 2d 924 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 914
(1964).
When Wild appealed from the district court order, 3 the court of ap-
peals determined the issue to be whether Wild, who might be incriminated
by the records, could consequently refuse to turn over the documents
to the government. Recognizing that, as a general rule, an officer of a
corporation may not successfully refuse to produce records on grounds
of self-incrimination, the court found an exception where the corporate
officer was the sole owner of the corporation, and the company was be-
lieved to embody the personal interest of its only constituent.4 Accord-
ingly, under this theory, Wild could assert his personal privilege against
self-incrimination and unreasonable search and seizure, and the court
could justifiably set aside the order to produce the records. 5
This position was reversed upon rehearing.6 No opinion was written
except for the listing of two cases, one of which established the doctrine
requiring an officer of a corporation to produce corporate records7 and
the other applied this doctrine to the sole owner of a company.8 In a
vigorous dissent, Justice Madden, who wrote the original majority opin-
ion, used that opinion verbatim and added his opinion that the courts
should emphasize the individual's privileges and not simply make a me-
chanical determination of whether or not the papers are corporate. He
suggested, in the light of recent Supreme Court cases which increased
the right of individuals, 9 that the court's decision in the instant case is
3 U.S. District Court for District of Arizona- (unreported decision). The district
court has jurisdiction to enforce summons when it is not obeyed. INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 7604.
4Compare U.S. v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944), wherein a similar test was used to
determine that a labor union was an artificial entil:y.
564-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9348 (9th Cir. 1964).
6 Wild v. Brewer, 329 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 914 (1964).
7 Wilson v. U.S., 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
s Grant v. U.S., 227 U.S. 74 (1913), citing the W'ilson case with approval.
9 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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anachronistic. However, pursuant to the majority opinion, the order
to produce the records was affirmed. 10
In considering this decision, the essential question is to what extent
the "public records doctrine" can be limited by the constitutional privi-
leges against unreasonable search and seizure and against serving as a
witness against oneself. The public records doctrine states that the privi-
lege against self-incrimination does-not protect individuals and corpora-
tions from being forced to produce records required by law. Specifically,
this note will analyze the problem of whether Wild, because of his posi-
tion as the sole owner of a corporation, can assert his privileges as an
individual rather than as an officer of the company, and, in the light of
the public records doctrine, what the privileges of either would be. The
analysis of the problem can be divided into:
1) the application of the doctrine of "public records required by law"
to federal income taxation; and
2) the manner in which these constitutional privileges have been applied
to individuals and corporations in the field of federal income taxation.
Pertaining to federal income taxation, the public records doctrine can
be explained as follows: the privilege against self incrimination Which
exists regarding private papers does not protect individuals and corpora-
tions against being forced to produce records required by law. The doc-
trine was established as dictum in the case of Wilson v. U.S." This case
recognized that a state has visitorial powers to inspect records of cor-
porations which it has created. In a later decision when officers sought
to inspect public documents, the court, relying on the Wilson precedent,
forced the custodian to produce the records. 12 The Supreme Court of
the United States extended the visitorial powers of governments to all
records required by law. In the leading case, decided under emergency
wartime price control legislation, the Court held that the records required
under that act had to be produced despite constitutional guarantees.' 3
However, the Court provided a limitation in that, for the doctrine to
apply, the transactions must be appropriate subjects of government regu-
lation of the enforcement of restrictions validly established. The doctrine
is thus limited to circumstances Where the activity sought to be regulated
has a sufficient relation to public concern.14
10 Wild v. Brewer, supra note 6. 11 Supra note 7, at 380.
12 Davis v. U.S., 328 U.S. 582 (1946), citing the Wilson case with approval.
13 U.S. v. Shapiro, 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
14 ibid. Justice Jackson, in his dissent, cautioned that mere convenience of law en-
forcement should not be sufficient to justify invasion of privacy, and that the effect
of the decision would be to diminish the right of privacy regarding records which
become public per se if required by statute.
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This public records doctrine finds aplication under the federal tax
law. The Internal Revenue Code provides in section 600115 the require-
ment of records and in section 760210 the authority to examine them.
Based on the public records doctrine, the constitutionality of these sec-
tions regarding self-incrimination and search and seizure has been upheld
in cases involving the civil liability of th2 taxpayer.'7 However, the ap-
plication of the doctrine to criminal cases has been limited. When a
defendant has refused to produce the records, the court has instructed the
jury to consider this refusal in determining intent.' Despite the constitu-
tional guarantees recognized by the courts, this type of instruction has
been construed as not impairing the privilege against self-incrimination.
One court has said, by way of dictum, that the claim of self-incrimination
would not prevail because of the statute which requires taxpayers to keep
records.19
Therefore, in the instant case, under the public records doctrine neither
the corporation nor one acting as custodian on behalf of the corporation
would be able to protect the records' from examination for federal in-
come taxes. As an individual, Wild might be able to hold back personal
records, but the jury could consider his refusal in determining his intent.20
The constitutional privileges Of interest in the relationship between
15 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6001: "Every person liable for any tax imposed by this
title .... shall keep such records ... as the Secretary or his delegate may ... prescribe."
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, S 7203 provides that failure to keep records is a misdemeanor.
16 Supra note 1.
17 U.S. v. Bouschor, 200 F. Supp. 541 .(D.C. Minn. 1961), (serving summons on at-
torney); Falsone v. U.S., 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied 346 U.S. 864(1953), (summons of CPA to produce work papers); Brownson v. U.S., 32 F.2d 844
(8th Cir. 1929) (summons of telegraph company as third party). See also U.S. v.
United Distillers Products Corp. 156 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1948), holding that the Inter-
nal Revenue Service, while investigating tax deficiencies, should not be required to
prove grounds of its belief; Eberhart v. Broadrock Development Corp., 296 F.2d 685
(6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 871 (1961)., where a special agent did not have
to show reasonable grounds to believe tax returns were fraudulent.
18 Beard v. U.S., 222 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955),(whether the defendant willfully filed a false return);.Smith v. U.S., 236 F.2d 260 (8th
Cir. 1956), where in a net worth investigation only information that taxpayer would
give as to how he had accumulated funds was "Lets [sic.] just say I dug it up in an old
iron pot" and "I found it in an old mail bag." TLe second statement could have been
true because the taxpayer had formerly been convicted of stealing mail.
19 U.S. v. Willis, 145 F. Supp. 365 (D.C. Ga. 1955). An attorney raised the privilege
of self-incrimination for his client. The court disposed of this assertion on two
grounds: (1) the attorney could not make the clim for his client; and (2) the claim
was not timely made. It is interesting to note that even though the claim was dis-
missed for the above reasons, the court still mentioned that the privilege of self-
incrimination would not apply in such a case.
20 Supra notes 17 and 18.
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individuals and corporations in relation to federal income taxation are
the fourth and fifth amendments to the Constitution. The fourth amend-
ment guarantees that one shall not suffer unreasonable search and seizure,
and the fifth amendment grants the privilege against self-incrimination
to an individual. As to individuals, Boyd v. U.S.21 developed the concept
of an interplay between the two amendments by holding that production
of private papers compelling an individual to be a witness against him-
self is equivalent to an unreasonable search and seizure. Thus, interaction
between protection of an individual from self-incrimination and protec-
tion of his right to be left alone was established.
This interaction between the two amendments regarding individual
privileges is not present when corporate privileges are determined. Be-
cause the protection against self-incrimination is personal, a corporation,
not being a natural person, is unable to assert this privilege. 22 Since the
corporation does not have the privilege, it follows that one cannot claim
the privilege as an officer or employee acting on behalf of a corporation. 23
However, the corporation does have the privilege against unreasonable
search and seizure, 24 and if this privilege is violated, the corporation need
not produce the documents. In all other situations, the corporation may
be compelled to produce its records. 25 For example, in Wilson v. U.S. ,20
an officer of a corporation refused to produce corporate records which
included his personal letters. The court held that he could withdraw the
21 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
2 2 Wilson v. U.S., 221 U.S. 361 (1961). Accord U.S. v. Guterma, 272 F.2d 344 (2d
Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 949 (1959); Curcio v. U.S., 354 U.S. 118 (1957);
Grant v. U.S., 227 U.S. 74 (1913); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
23 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). An officer, while he may be asked to identify
and authenticate records, does not have to testify against himself orally. The reason
for this rule is that oral statements are considered to be personal, while the records
belong to the corporation.
24 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. U.S., 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
25 Oklahoma Press v. Wallings, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); Esgee Co. of China v. U.S. 262
U.S. 151 (1923); Wheeler v. U.S., 226 U.S. 478 (1913), (corporation had been dissolved);
Wilson v. U.S., supra note 7; Lagow v. U.S., 159 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1946), per curium,
cert. denied, 331 U.S. 858 (1946). It is interesting to note that in determining liabilities
for tax, the authority to examine any records which are relevant is provided by INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7602, supra note 1. Of course, this authority is limited by the
above-mentioned constitutional rights. These privileges of the taxpayer may be vio-
lated through misrepresentation by the examining agent. If no misrepresentation has
in fact occurred when the taxpayer voluntarily produces his records for examina-
tion, he has in effect waived such privileges, Legotas v. U.S., 222 F.2d 678 (9th Cir.
1955), because the evidence produced for the civil examination is not suppressed in
the criminal prosecution. U.S. v. Cooper, 288 Fed. 604 (D.C. Iowa 1925), aff'd 9 F.2d
216 (1925).
26 Supra, note 7.
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personal letters, but that keeping said letters in the corporate books did
not make the books themselves personal; thus, the officer had to produce
the records for the grand jury. This is a case wherein the individual
records were protected, while the corporate ones were not.
27
Consequently, it appears in the instant case that since the special agent28
had not misled Wild,29 neither Wild as an officer of the corporation, nor
the corporation itself could assert any violation of the privilege against
unreasonable search and seizure.30 For the same reason, Wild as an indi-
vidual could assert this privilege only as ir. interacted with the privilege
against self-incrimination.
In conclusion, it has been noted from i:he facts of the principal case
that neither a corporation nor one acting for a corporation has any
privilege against governmental authority to require the production of
records under the public records doctrine. Consequently, the court's
decision is consistent with the prevailing rules of law. Furthermore, even
if the court had considered Wild's corpcration to be his alter-ego, in
view of the application of the public records doctrine to tax cases, the
possibility exists that the individual privilege of self-incrimination would
still not have been available, and even if it were, the jury would have
been able to consider his refusal to produce the records. Thus, individual
privileges do not necessarily prevail when pitted against the public records
doctrine in the field of federal income taxation.
Robert Naiman
27 Supra note 7. In a vigorous dissent, Justice McKenna said that the case should not
be decided on the title of the books but on the grounds that the books were obtained
to convict him. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2259b (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
28 A distinction must be made between a revenue agent and a special agent. The
revenue agent is responsible for the routine audit which involves the civil liability of
the taxpayer. When he discovers an indication of fraud, a special agent, who is
responsible for the criminal aspects, will be called in, and the two will work together
on a joint investigation. See U.S. v. Wolrich, 129 F. Supp. 528 (D.C. N.Y. 1955).
29 A violation of a taxpayer's privileges occurs when the taxpayer believes that the
is under a routine examination by a revenue agent, and is unaware that he is under
a joint investigation. The violation results when the taxpayer is misled regarding the
responsibilities and intentions of the agent. In sucli a case, a special agent supervised
the revenue agent's work for over two years, and the taxpayer never knew the special
agent was involved in the case. U.S. v. Lipshitz, 132 F. Supp. 519 (D.C. N.Y. 1955). In
a similar situation, a revenue agent told the taxpayer he was making a routine investiga-
tion, when, in fact, there were indications of fraud, and he was examining for evidence
of criminal prosecution. U.S. v. Wolrich, supra note 27. Thus, such misrepresentation
by the agent nullified the prior consent of the taxpayer for the agent to examine his
records. Contra, Frank v. U.S., 245 F.2d 284 (3rd Cir. 1957), in which the jury was
told not to consider evidence obtained by fraud.
30 Accord Lagow v. U.S., supra note 24; Wilson -. U.S., supra note 7; Grant v. U.S.,
supra note 8.
